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Abstract
Tennessee was the first state to introduce performance based funding
metrics into their higher education system in 1979. Over the past 30+ years, the
state reevaluated and amended their formula every five years. What was initially
an additional allocation that could be earned on top of an institution’s standard
budget has now become the sole method of allocating funds for higher education
in Tennessee. In 2010 the Tennessee legislature passed the Complete College
Tennessee Act, Which put the state on the path to be the first state in the nation
that allocates 100% of higher education funds on the basis of a performance
based funding formula. In order to learn how Tennessee ultimately created this
policy, I looked at the various changes to Tennessee’s funding formulae since it
was introduced in 1979, evaluating the purpose of each change, and culminating
in a complete analysis of Tennessee’s radical new formula. Although for the first
time in Tennessee’s history, funding changes were initially proposed by the state
legislature, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, who was tasked with
developing the formula, was able to take all of the lessons learned since 1979
and developed a formula that initially appears to be stable and will lead to
success. By examining the process that Tennessee went through, my hope is that
if Tennessee is successful in implementing this 100% formula, other states may
appreciate the process it took to get to this model, and not jump into formulation
of a formula without laying the necessary groundwork.
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Introduction
Performance-based funding in higher education is an ongoing policy
discussion in the United States. By the end of 2013, in 12 states a portion of
higher education funding is contingent on performance-based metrics, and 19
other states are in formal discussion on implementing performance basedfunding, and 4 others are in the process of transitioning. Of the 13 states who
have implemented performance based funding —Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington—the majority allocate 5% or less of
their funding for performance metrics, with exceptions in Louisiana (15%), and
Tennessee (100%) (National Council of State Legislatures, n.d.). With Tennessee
being the only state to move entirely to a performance-based model, it has
become an excellent case study in how competition for government dollars and
performance metrics affect university actions, and impact the number of college
graduates. Further, Tennessee was the first state to implement any form of
performance-based funding into higher education in 1979 (Layzell, 1998).
During the spring 2010 legislative session, the Tennessee General Assembly
passed the Complete College Tennessee Act of 2010 (CCTA) (Complete College
Tennessee Act (CCTA), 2010). CCTA fundamentally altered Tennessee’s
approach to higher education. Rather than funding universities based on how
many students are enrolled at the end of the second full week of school, The
Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) was tasked with producing a
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set of outcomes and progression metrics that would be used in creating a
funding formula. The purpose of this research is to learn: how the state of
Tennessee has implemented performance based funding in higher education,
and what is so radically different about its latest approach, the Complete College
Tennessee Act of 2010?
How some states are implementing with performance based funding
This paper will focus on Tennessee’s path of developing and
implementing performance based funding in higher education, but it is good to
see how other states are currently implementing models based on the same
philosophical principles.
Louisiana currently has 15% of higher education funding allocated based
on performance indicators. Louisiana has developed 3 separate goals: reaching
the SREB’s average rate of adult populations with post-secondary education by
2025, foster innovation through research, and increase accountability efficiency,
and effectiveness in higher education. Within each of these 3 goals, there are
multiple performance indicators that the state is grading its institutions on.
Because of the 3-part approach, Louisiana has developed several dozen
indicators on which institutions are graded (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2012).
Pennsylvania allocates 2.4% of their higher education budget based on
performance indicators. In Pennsylvania, there are 3 different categories of
performance indicators: student success, access, and stewardship. Within all
three of those, some indicators are mandatory, 3-5 may be chosen from between
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the groups, and then each university may develop up to two indicators of their
own. Because of this approach, there is no way to holistically measure
institutions against each other, since each institution has the ability to pick and
choose the majority of the measures that will be used to assess them.
Pennsylvania just instituted this policy in 2011, and it is too soon to be able to
evaluate the effectiveness of its malleable model (Pennsylvania State System of
Higher Education, 2012).
Illinois allocates less than 1% of their higher education funding through
performance based metrics. Although there is not a lot of money allocated, they
use metrics similar to those in Tennessee: bachelor’s degrees, master’s degrees,
doctoral degrees, degrees/100 FTE, 6-year graduation rate, research funding, 24
hours of course completion, cost per credit hour, and cost per completion.
Illinois introduced these measures in an attempt to have 60% of adults in the
state to have some sort of higher education credentials by 2025 (National
Council of State Legislatures, n.d.).
What are performance based indicators?
Performance based indicators have traditionally been used for two
different reasons in budget decisions: deciding on where to make savings based
on efficiency, and using performance indicators to drive the initial budgeting
process. By measuring the performance of various departments, and personnel,
an organization can then determine how efficient each one of them is in using
their funds. Once the more inefficient departments are located, they can be
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targeted for revision in order to bring their performance in line with the rest of
the organization; however there have also been instances of increasing efficiency
by simple line-item budget cuts without any actual revision of the department.
Rather than incentivizing improvement, performance indicators are used as a
justification to reduce a budget without taking time to understand why that
department is underperforming. Rather than using performance to simply
reallocate funding, setting realistic, if loose, targets for organizations is a way to
often increase savings within any budget. (Miller, Roberts, & Keum, 2007)
Performance indicators have been measured in two separate ways as
well. In the public sector, indicators are often used as more of a “scorecard,” to
measuring performance in a small scale. The public sector is using performance
indicators in a much broader fashion because they have access to large data sets
and more sophisticated analytic tools (Smith & Goddard, 2002). In England, the
National Health Service Hospitals instituted performance funding in 2003. They
are public; not-for-profit institutions that were first formed in 1948, and are the
largest and oldest single-payer healthcare system. During an evaluation of the
transition to performance funding in 2008, the researchers came to the
conclusion that most hospitals were not showing any major responses to the
performance indicators. They argue that because most of the employees of NHS
hospitals see themselves as working for the community, rather than their
particular hospital, they do not respond to performance incentives. There is not
a sense of competition between the hospitals to drive performance to the front
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of many employees mind, and this they are not reactive to the intended
incentives that are created by performance funding. What this research suggests
is that a sense of competition is essential for any performance based funding,
either within an organization for their limited resources, or between
organizations to draw in more customers to increase net revenue (Sussex &
Farrar, 2009).
There has been some discussion in higher education about using
performance indicators to evaluate individual faculty and their research output.
In 2003, Ingo Liefner compared 6 institutions of higher education from across
the world and talked with their faculty about this type of funding. What he
learned was that, in a research context, performance funding would be a
detriment to the body of scholarly knowledge, and relatively ineffective at
“bettering” a university. If the indicators are focused at revenue gleaned from
research, then basic research would likely decrease in the face of applied
research. Also, faculty members who focus less on producing research would be
incentivized to produce more scholarly literature just to maintain their position,
regardless of their desire and passion to continue researching; whereas the
primary researchers will not change their behavior, because they are already
performing at a level that this type of model would incentivize. This shows that
performance indicators in education are most likely not beneficial at an
individual level to incentivize changes in faculty, but leaves open the door for
broad performance indicators (Liefner, 2003)
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In higher education, performance funding has had a very rocky history of
implementation and failure in various states. The inherent difficulties involved
in measuring such a complex system have led to the downfall and struggle most
states encounter. Some states, like Arkansas, have tried to focus more on
efficiency than quality. Other states like Tennessee and Missouri focused more
on quality than efficiency. The unstable programs often suffered more influence
from outside indicators like legislatures, business leaders, and executive officials.
Major struggle for performance funding in higher education is defining clear and
precise definitions and goals for the funding formula. What is “success” for a
university? Does success vary from institution to institution? Is the state looking
to judge schools based on their ability to transfer graduating students into the
workforce, or are they looking for an educated population in the hopes that a
more educated workforce will be successful in turning their knowledge into
economic advancement and innovation? From there, there are the practical
problems of transferring the defined goal into outcomes and weights to
meaningful measures. It is this struggle in definition setting that has led to a lot
of instability in some performance based programs in higher education. (Burke
& Modarresi, 2000).
With a more general understanding of performance indicators and the
difficulty of implementing them into higher education, I now want to examine
some of the best practices that have arisen in the realm of higher education in
regards to performance based indicators. In higher education, the metrics used
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to measure performance tend to be along the lines of course completion,
research funding allocations received, and graduation rates. In the 1990s,
enough research had been completed to produce a sufficient list of best practices
involved in higher education’s experimentation with performance inficators:


Keep the number of performance indicators low (<20)



“performance indicators should not be developed in a top-down
manner



There needs to be buy-in by the state and faculty. Both should be
involved in creating the formula



Institutions are different, indicators must be able to reflect this
without negatively impacting schools



There need to be financial incentives for institutions



Policy-makers often more easily absorb quantitative measures
than qualitative measures.



Performance results should be easy to understand, and
communicated in a timely manner (Layzell, 1998)

Performance Indicators
The number of indicators is important to the success of any model. By
having too few indicators, a state will likely ignore multiple objectives of the
model. Further, any small failure by an institution could result in a substantial
decrease in funding because of a single indicator; however, having too many
indicators creates a different set of problems. If there are so many indicators that
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each one represents <2% of an institutions budget, institutions will not feel the
financial loss of slightly underperforming in a number of areas. This leads to
institutions being able to actively decide to ignore certain objectives, with the
belief that they can make it up somewhere else in the formula. The number of
indicators should be small enough to carry significant financial weight and
institutional direction without being so few that the formula can do neither job
effectively.
Institutions of higher education all have individual mission statements,
goals, and purposes. A 2-year community college focused on preparing a slew of
medical personnel (nurses, X-ray technicians, etc.) will focus their resources
very differently than a 4-year research university that is a premier graduate
university as well. Performance indicators need to be tailored to accurately
measure all types of institutions without placing others at a disadvantage.
Buy-In
Legislation that is seen to be interfering or manipulating the education
system is often met with backlash from teachers and administration. Buy-in is
essential to the successful implementation of any program, but especially one
with millions of dollars and thousands of student’s futures at stake. State
legislators are not experts on running a higher education institution, nor should
they be. Government officials are important for two reasons: 1. The officials are
the ones who actually vote on the formula and 2. The officials represent the
interests of the state during the discussion. Public institutions, specifically 2-year
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community colleges and technical schools, serve specific purposes in ensuring
the state has an adequately trained workforce for both the present and future.
Keeping faculty and administration involved in the process is also
essential for a couple of reasons. First, these individuals know what is working
and what isn’t at the campus level. They have insight to how changes to
performance indicators may directly impact behavior on campus. We must
remember that performance funding is not simply a tool to measure institutions,
but to also help guide them in ways that the state deems beneficial.
Implementation of a formula does not guarantee success, and having members
from campus involved in the formulation process can help circumvent any
problems that may arise. Secondly, if members of campus are invested in the
performance indicators they will actively work within the framework, rather
than raise criticism of the state for imposing unrealistic/unreliable performance
indicators. “Educators find fault with virtually every attempt to measure
educational outcomes,” (Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996). Buy-in is essential
from all parties, not just for the successful identification of performance
indicators, but also for political and public relations reasons.
The Origins of Performance-funding in Tennessee
In 1975, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, in conjunction
with the Kellogg Foundation and the Ford Foundation researched, “the
philosophical and technical feasibility,” of having a portion of higher education
funding come form performance indicators instead of enrollment (Bogue, Trout,
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1980). This process was initiated by the THEC, not directed by the state
legislature. The hope of the Commission was to “improve the return on
[Tennessee’s] higher education investment,” (Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996).
By 1979, Tennessee had implemented the nation’s first performance-based
funding model in higher education. Figure 1 on page 10 shows the performance
indicators used in each formula for 1979-1997.
1979-1982
Tennessee’s first model allowed public institutions to earn an additional
2% of funding. The first model had 5 separate metrics, weighted at 20% apiece.
These metrics were:
1. Program accreditation
2. Graduate performance on an in-field standardized test
3. Graduate performance on a general education standardized test
4. Satisfaction surveys on university academic programs and
services by current and former students, as well as community
members and employers
5. Peer evaluation of academic programs.
The only significant change to the metrics was after the first year (79-80), item
(5) was changed from peer-review plans for institutional improvement.
1983-1987
Beginning in 1983, Tennessee evaluated and revised their funding
formula every five years, and the performance indicators were all strengthened
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and finessed. The document that described the funding guidelines doubled in
length between 1979 and 1982 (Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996). More
programs were being evaluated by the formula, and the general education test
was standardized. Previously, each institution was given to opportunity to create
their personal general education test. In order to standardize the results form
institutions across the state, Tennessee began using the ACT College Outcome
Measures Program (COMP) test for all schools in 1983. The Act Comp is designed
to:


Test graduates general education skills



help institutions revise their curriculum to help students meet
their needs



Be an valid exam to show accountability and proof that higher
education is effective (Ohio Office of Institutional Research, 2996)

Tennessee also changed the weights applied to each performance
indicator. The five indicators would no longer carry equal weight in the formula.
1. Program Accreditation – 25%
2. Program field evaluation – 30%
3. General Education testing – 25%
4. Instructional Improvement – 10%
5. Planning for program improvement – 10%
(Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996)
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Because the nature of the performance indicators is to help universities selfimprove, the weights reflect that importance. Program accreditation is essential
for any university. At the implementation of the first formula in 1979, 83% of
university programs were accredited across the state. By 1983, the number had
risen slightly to 85%. By giving the accreditation performance indicator more
weight, the committee was able to further incentivize accreditation at schools
where it was lacking.
Further emphasis was also placed on evaluating graduates. Overall,
testing of graduates received an increase of 15% across performance indicators
(2) and (3). In total, 55% of the performance funding is based around student
performance on both general education and major related exams. The state
needs to be producing qualified members of the workforce through higher
education. By placing so much importance on student success in the formula,
institutions are tasked with not just ensuring their students graduate, but that
their graduates are prepared to enter the state’s workforce.
Indicator (4) is essentially a satisfaction survey taken by graduates and
alumni. Surveys like this are important, because it measures institutions on
areas of campus that may not necessarily be academic, but are still important to
higher education, such as housing, dining services, etc.. Only weighing this at
10% gives institutions an incentive provide adequate services and leave
students with a good impression of the institution, without unnecessarily
penalizing a school for subjective reasons.
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The final indicator (5) puts an impetus on institutions to always be trying
to improve their academic programs. Where indicators (2) and (3) focus on the
outcomes of the programs currently in place, indicator (5) shows an institution
that is planning to keep all of its programs relevant in the future. This also helps
keep faculty actively involved in the assessment and evaluation of the university.
Further, there was a large push in the 1980s by the regional accrediting agencies
for institutions to document quality and effectiveness through institutional
evaluation practices. Institutions were tasked with evaluating the various
aspects of campus that were impacted by performance-based funding.
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Figure 1
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1988-1992
After the first full five-year period expired, the THEC returned to the
funding formula for review. On the whole, the formula was working as the
drafters intended, and only minor changes to the weights employed were
implemented. Accreditation was reduced by 5%, as well as the general education
tests. Those 10 percentage points were evenly distributed to satisfaction surveys
and institutional planning (Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996).
1993-1997
The third cycle of the formula brought many changes with it. The number
of performance indicators doubled from five to ten, with each weighted evenly.
The five new indicators were:
1. Peer-review of non-accreditable undergraduate programs
2. Master’s program reviews (universities) or placement (2-year
institutions)
3. Enrollment goals for specific groups
4. Persistence to graduation
5. Mission-specific objectives
Beyond adding five new indicators, institutions were able to choose the focus
within some of the metrics. For instance, institutions were given the ability to
choose which target population (minority, gifted, etc.) they wanted to enroll
more of. The extension of peer-review to non-accreditable programs was also

18

very much approved of by faculty members (Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996).
At this point, more than 90% of programs throughout all institutions were
accredited (Bogue, Dandridge, 2010); however, some programs simply could not
receive accreditation, because they were designed specifically for a regional
need or lacked the infrastructure required by the accreditation agencies (Banta,
Rudolph, Van Dyke, 1996).
2000-2005
In the 2000 formula, the number of performance indicators was reduced
to 4, with subcategories within. The four major categories were:
1. Academic Testing and Program Review
a. Foundation Testing of General Education Outcomes
b. Pilot Evaluations of Other General Education Outcome Measures
c. Program
i. Accountability
ii. Review
iii. Accreditation
d. Major Field Testing
2. Satisfaction Surveys
a. Student/Alumni/Employer Surveys
b. Transfer and Articulation
3. Planning and Collaboration
a. Mission Distinctive Institutional Goals
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b. State Strategic Plan Goals
4. Student Outcomes and Implementation
a. Output Attainment
i. Retention/Persistence
ii. Job Placement (2-year institutions only)
b. Assessment Implementation
Of the 4 performance indicators, (1) maintained largely a rebranding of
indicators already in place. Its intended overall goal was to incentivize
institutional academic competitiveness and graduate comprehension. Within
indicator (2) the addition of Transfer and Articulation is interesting. This is the
first time in nearly 20 years of the formula that institutions are being
incentivized to make it easier to transfer schools throughout the state. This
shows the beginnings of seeing higher education as a collaborative effort
throughout the state, and recognizing that students may decide to transfer
schools for any number of reasons. Performance indicators (3) and (4) both
maintain the general purpose of the previous iterations indicators. The only
noteworthy addition is (3b) State Strategic Plan Goals. This rewards institutions
for actively moving in the direction desired by the state. This shows a shift from
internal, individual, improvement of institutions, and further ties institutions of
higher education together into a cohesive unit with a defined purpose: preparing
the workforce of tomorrow (THEC, 2000)
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2005-2010
This is the 7th performance formula in the state of Tennessee, and the last
to be a part of the regular 5-year cycle of review and revision. The formula
maintained primary indicators, with subcategories therein. The only major
revision was taking (4.a.i) out, and strengthening it to be an indicator all its own.
This brought the total number of primary indicators to five, and increased the
weight of “Student Persistence” form 5% to 15%. Student retention was
calculated by measuring the number of first-time full-time (FTFT) freshmen who
returned in the next fall term. Student persistence to graduation was measured
by using the standard 6-year graduation rate. Both of these measure were taken
twice: once for all students, and once for FTFT African-American students
(THEC, 2005).
What Tennessee Did Right
Tennessee has been considered one of the best in performance-based
funding for higher education, since they first implemented it in 1979. Since its
implementation, the THEC has been leading the charge, rather than the
legislature. By keeping the process relatively apolitical, Tennessee has managed
to maintain a fairly stable system across a 30 year period (Dougherty, Natow,
2010). The entire process was initiated by higher education experts who took
slow, deliberate steps in regards to forming and revising the formula. The
formula was developed by all of the major stakeholders, and was not a zero-sum
game. No institution could “take” money from another. Each institution earned
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their allocation independent of any other institutions score, and the formula was
strong (Bogue, Dandridge, 2010). Unlike some states (Florida) who had up to 37
performance indicators, Tennessee stayed with 5 for just over a decade, before it
expanded to 10-14 for the last 15 years. It’s worth noting that even with an
expansion of indicators, the original 5 were maintained in some form or fashion
throughout this entire span. The consistency and slow revision of the formula
ensured stability for institutions to invest in changes to fit the formula
(Dougherty, Natow, 2011). This is evident just by examining the accreditation of
programs in Tennessee between 1980 and 2006. When the program was first
implemented, Tennessee’s rate of accredited programs was around 82%. In
2006 that number was 99%. The formula achieved its goal by incentivizing
institutions to become accredited (and keep too that indicator), reforms were
made across the state to maximize their amount of funding by receiving
accreditation. Nearly every institution now actively assesses itself in order to
improve. Even if the formula remained incredibly stable throughout its thirtyyear lifespan, institutions were active in improving both their quality and
student services (Bogue, Dandridge, 2011).
CCTA
In 2010, the state of Tennessee passed the Complete College Tennessee
Act of 2010 (CCTA). At that time, 29.9% of Tennesseans aged 25-64 held an
associate’s degree or higher. The national average in 2010 was 37.2%, which is a
7.3% difference (Rhoda, 2010). Tennessee’s 6-year graduation rate was 46% and
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was in the bottom ten states in the nation for both bachelor (40th) degree and
associate (45th) degree attainment. Because Tennessee does not institute a state
income tax, the majority of its tax revenue comes through sales taxes, which are
entirely dependent on the population’s ability to spend money. Using the year
2025 as a benchmark, Tennessee would have to increase the number of college
graduates annually, annually to meet the national average. If Tennessee were
able to reach the national average, its citizens would earn an estimated $6 billion
more annually, bringing in $400 million to the state through tax revenue,
annually. With this information in hand, as well as a 3rd-party assessment of
Tennessee’s higher education system commissioned by the governor’s office,
Tennessee set to work in drafting what would become CCTA (Complete College
America, 2010).
CCTA brought major changes for higher education in Tennessee. On the
whole, CCTA tied Tennessee’s higher education system with the state’s economic
development. With the goal of achieving the national average of higher education
graduates by 2025, Tennessee instituted these changes:


Develop a state-wide master plan for higher education with input from
universities, community colleges, and technology centers



Create or revise institutional mission statements that differentiate the
unique missions of each institution and align with the new master plan



Standardize general education requirements across both the Tennessee
Board of Regents (TBR) system and the University of Tennessee (UT)
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system of higher education institutions to allow for full transferability
between higher education institutions across the state


Any student admitted to a TBR institution can be granted admission to UT
institutions concurrently, if so desired, and vice versa



4-year institutions are no longer allowed to offer remedial courses. Any
remedial courses to “catch up” recent high school graduates will be
offered by the community colleges



TBR, in consultation with the Tennessee Higher Education Commission
(THEC) will bring together all of the community colleges under what will
be known as the Tennessee Community College System



A common course numbering system should be instituted throughout the
community colleges



Under the guidance of THEC, a new funding formula based on
performance indicators must be implemented that includes, but is not
limited to: end of term enrollment, student retention, progression to a
degree, degree production, and graduation rates (CCTA, 2010)

Funding Formula
What would ultimately become the most dramatic change in Tennessee
higher education would be the new funding formula required under CCTA.
Unlike the pre-emptive action from the THEC in the late 1970s, this time the
state government was legislating performance-based metrics for higher
education funding. The committee that ultimately created the funding
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formula was headed by the THEC, with 24 members from both university
systems, including faculty members and administrative staff, as well as
members from the state. Every actor who had a stake in the success of the
funding formula was represented during its construction (Tennessee Higher
Education Formula Review Committee, 2010). The formula that was
ultimately decided upon was the first of its kind in Tennessee and the nation.
95% of higher education funding would be allocated based on performance
metrics, rather than the “enrollment-plus” method of the past. The other 5%
accounts for mandatory costs, such as utilities. Effectively, Tennessee’s
outcomes based funding formula is responsible for 100% of a university’s
budget. Due to the unique purposes of both universities and community
colleges, each type of institution has its own particular funding formula. For
the purposes of this research, I will be focusing on the university funding
formula and the differences between each institution therein.

(Tennessee

Higher

Education

Commission,

2011)

Data
4,619
5,200
5,385
4,593
1,573
477
$128.1M
822
20
66%

Figure 2

Outcome
Student Progression: 24 Credit Hours
Student Progression: 48 Credit Hours
Student Progression: 72 Credit Hours
Bachelors Degrees
Masters Degrees
Doctoral/Law Degrees
Research/Grant Funding
Student Transfers
Degrees per 100 FTE
Graduation Rate
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

Scale
Factor
1
1
1
1
0.30
0.05
20,000
1
0.02
0.04

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Scaled
Data
4,619
5,200
5,385
4,593
5,244
9,540
6,404
822
989
1,641
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CCTA Funding Formula with UT Knoxville’s 2010 Data: Phase 1
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Outcome
Student Progression: 24 Credit Hours
Student Progression: 48 Credit Hours
Student Progression: 72 Credit Hours
Bachelors Degrees
Masters Degrees
Doctoral/Law Degrees
Research/Grant Funding
Student Transfers
Degrees per 100 FTE
Graduation Rate

Figure 3

Scaled
Data
4,619
5,200
5,385
4,593
5,244
9,540
6,404
822
989
1,641
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Weight
2%
3%
5%
15%
15%
10%
15%
5%
10%
20%
Total

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Weighted
Outcome
92
156
269
689
787
954
961
41
99
328
4,376
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CCTA Funding Formula with UT Knoxville’s 2010 Data: Phase 1
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As in Figures 3 and 4, the formula is divided into 10 “outcome” categories:
1. Student Progression: 24 Hours

7. Research/Grant Funding

2. Student Progression: 48 Hours

8. Student Transfers

3. Student Progression: 72 Hours

9. Degrees per 100 Full

4. Bachelors Degrees
5. Masters Degrees

Time Equivalent (FTE)
10. Graduation Rate

6. Doctoral/Law Degrees

1-3: Student progression at 24, 48 and 72 hours
Students both transfer to different universities as well as drop out of
college. That being said, a university who contributes to their education should
not be penalized in the funding formula because the student changed their mind
about that school for any number of reasons. Each university in Tennessee
weighs these three progression indicators between 2-7%, with more weight
being placed on the higher progression checkpoints. Universities are better
rewarded the longer they retain students at their university.
4-6: Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral/Law Degrees
These three metrics carry the most weight for any school. The purpose of
CCTA was to bring Tennessee’s graduation rate up to the national average.
Increasing the number of adults who have some level of tertiary education will
help bolster Tennessee’s economy, and that is impossible if schools are not
graduating students. In order to incentive schools to successfully graduate
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students, the most weight is placed on those measures (Tennessee Higher
Education Commission, 2011).
7: Research/Grant Funding
An important function of universities is to give back to the scientific and
academic communities. In 2005, more than $45 billion was spent on research
by academic institutions in the United States. Universities should be encouraged
to continue giving back to the intellectual communities, and including this
measure does just that. Excluding it would be a disincentive for universities and
professors. Intellectual discoveries not only increase notoriety of the
institutions and professors who discover them, but they can also bring in a
hefty profit for those involved. If schools were disincentivized to increase their
research/grant funding, they would be less competitive to top-tier professors
who are looking for employment. Further, companies grow from innovation.
More than 5,100 start-ups have been created from university-based research
since 1980. University research not only contributes to the intellectual
communities in academia, but also to industry and the economic well-being of a
community (Neal, Smith, McCormick, 2008)
8: Student Transfers
Due to the nature of how graduation rates are counted, student transfers
must be accounted for as well in the funding formula. Universities are given
credit for any student that transfers out of their university who had
accumulated at least 12 credit hours before the transfer. These transfers are
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tracked by the THEC, and students who drop-out are not counted in this metric.
This is relevant to graduation rates, because once a student transfers, their
graduation counts to their new schools graduation rate, rather than the
university they transferred from. So, a student may leave their current
university for any number of reasons, but still graduate and contribute to the
overall goal of the state: meet national average of higher education degrees.
Instead of penalizing the university for a student leaving, since that student will
not count to the universities graduation rate, they are compensated by having
this performance indicator.
9: Degrees per 100 FTE
FTE stands for Full-Time Equivalent. Based on the number of professors,
each university has the number of “x” it should be producing based off of the
resources available. This metric uses degrees in place of “x.” Institutions that
are able to graduate more students with fewer resources will be rewarded. This
incentivizes institutions to not make frivolous decisions, because it will impact
their bottom line. Frivolous includes unnecessary hires, but can be primarily
focused on faculty teaching loads.
10: Graduation Rate
The formula awards points based on the six-year graduation rate of a
university. This includes graduates who transfer in from a different university.
Using the graduation rate as a performance indicator in addition to degree
attainment is important, because schools are rewarded not just by the absolute
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number of degrees, which benefits larger schools, but by the rate at which they
are awarding degrees. Schools are incentivized to graduate students
(performance indicators 4-6), but to also do it in a timely manner.
How the formula actually works
Now, with an understanding of the performance indicators, it is time to
delve into the nuts and bolts of the surprisingly simple formula. Figures 3 and 4
show the entire process, using the University of Tennessee Knoxville’s number
from 2010. In Figure 2, THEC gathers the actual numbers for all of the
performance indicators for a university. Each student who reaches an outcomes
threshold is counted as one, and the each dollar collected for research and grant
funding is counted as well. Because these numbers are not all easy to work with,
they are divided by a scale factor, which is applied to every university, to make
the numbers more manageable. Once the scale factor is applied, the data is
moved into Figure 3, where the weights are applied. Due to the differing
institutional mission and objectives, each institution chooses its own weights. In
this instance, UTK is the premiere research institution in the state of Tennessee,
and offers more graduate fields of study than most in the state schools. Because
of this, they have a smaller weight in baccalaureate degrees than any other 4year institution in Tennessee (THEC, 2013). Once every performance indicator
is scaled and weighed, it is added up into a total, as seen in Figure 4. Then the
weighted outcomes are multiplied by the SREB faculty salary multiplier. The
Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) compiles data from universities
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across the south, and “is one of the nation’s oldest, most comprehensive sources
on comparative data in public higher education,” (Southern Regional Education
Board (SREB), n.d.). The SREB compiles the averages of faculty pay from
universities and uses this to create the SREB faculty salary multiplier, which
helps states and institutions project allocations needed for current and future
faculty funding needs (SREB, 2011).

Outcomes Model Summary - UTK
Data
Scaled Data
4,619
4,619
5,200
5,200
5,385
5,385
4,593
4,593
1,573
5,244
477
9,540
$128.1M
6,404
822
822
20
989
66%
1,641

Total Weighted Outcomes
4,376

Avg SREB
Salary
89,473

=

Subtotal
391,531,000

M&O, Utilities
Equipment
Performance Funding

+
+
+

74,993,000
19,177,000
22,897,000

x

Grand Total Calculation

Weight
2%
3%
5%
15%
15%
10%
15%
5%
10%
20%
Total

Weighted
Outcome
92
156
269
689
787
954
961
41
99
328
4,376

Outcome
Students Accumulating 24 hrs
(Scale=1)
Students Accumulating 48 hrs
(Scale=1)
Students Accumulating 72 hrs
(Scale=1)
Bachelors and Associates
(Scale=1)
Masters/Ed Specialist Degrees (Scale=0.3)
Doctoral / Law Degrees
(Scale=.05)
Research and Service
(Scale=20,000)
Transfers Out with 12 hrs
(Scale=1)
Degrees per 100 FTE
(Scale=.02)
Six-Year Graduation Rate
(Scale=.04)

508,598,000

Figure 4 (Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2011)
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Figure 4 shows the entire process using only the final numbers. The Data
column consists of the raw data that THEC acquires, such as the exact number of
students to reach each outcomes threshold, exact graduation rate, and the total
grant and research dollars. Scaled Data comprises the values once the scale
(which can be seen in parentheses in the Outcome column), which normalize the
values into whole numbers, regardless of unit. At that point, the institution’s
weights are applied to create the final value that will be attributed to each
outcome, the Weighted Outcome. From there, the weighted outcome is
multiplied to the universities individual average SREB salary number, which
produces the total dollar amount an institution has earned through their
outcomes in the Subtotal. The numbers below (M&O, Utilities, and Equipment)
are the standard operational costs that each institution should be granted,
regardless of outcomes. Those numbers are added to the Subtotal, which
ultimately leaves the institution with their final dollar amount that THEC will ask
for from the state for higher education appropriations.
The funding model also incentivizes institutions to serve
underrepresented populations. Any student coming from low socioeconomic
status or is an adult student is represented as 1.25 people, rather than one
person. This encourages institutions to bring in students who may be firstgeneration college students, or adults who dropped out or ignored higher
education for any number of reasons.
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The funding formulae are different between universities and community
colleges, because of the differences between the missions of each type of
institution. In Figure 5, the universities are in order from the largest weight in
bachelor’s degrees (UTM) to the lowest weight in bachelor’s degrees (UTK).
While some may be concerned that universities are able to influence their
individual weights, Figure 5 shows that there are only small variations among
universities. The largest difference is the difference between UTM and UTK’s
bachelor degree weight, with a difference of 15%; however, in context of each
schools mission, this difference makes sense. UTM is a primarily undergraduate
university that does not offer a single doctoral program. As such, their largest
weight is bachelor degree attainment, because that is the school’s primary goal.
On the other hand, UTK has dozens of doctoral degree programs, and brings in
52 times the amount of research and grant funding as UTM (THEC, 2013).
Because each university can accomplish different goals in higher education, their
weights need to be tailored to their capabilities and goals specifically. It would
be unfair to grade UTM based off of their doctoral degrees when they don’t have
a single doctoral degree program. Yet the formula does not allow for major
differences between universities. The credit hour progression weight is the same
at all but two universities (U of M and UTK), and the other metrics see small
variation (within 5%), excluding UTK compared to both UTM and APSU, who
are both focused almost entirely on their undergraduate degree production.
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Figure 5: TN university weight percentages.
Weights Based on
Institutional Mission
Student Progression: 24
Credit Hours
Student Progression: 48
Credit Hours
Student Progression: 72
Credit Hours

UTM

APSU

TTU

UTC

MTSU

3.0%

3.0%

3.0%

3.0%

3.0%

5.0%

5.0%

5.0%

5.0%

5.0%

7.0%

7.0%

7.0%

7.0%

7.0%

Bachelor’s Degrees
Masters/Ed Specialist
Degrees

30.0%

25.0%

25.0%

25.0%

25.0%

15.0%

20.0%

15.0%

15.0%

15.0%

Doctoral / Law Degrees

0.0%

0.0%

5.0%

5.0%

7.5%

Research/Grant Funding 10.0%

10.0%

10.0%

10.0%

12.5%

Student Transfers

10.0%

10.0%

10.0%

10.0%

5.0%

Degrees per 100 FTE
Six-Year Graduation
Rate

15.0%

10.0%

10.0%

10.0%

10.0%

5.0%
100.0%

10.0%
100.0%

10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Weights Based on
Institutional Mission
Student Progression: 24
Credit Hours
Student Progression: 48
Credit Hours
Student Progression: 72
Credit Hours

ETSU

TSU

UM

UTK

3.0%

3.0%

2.0%

2.0%

5.0%

5.0%

3.0%

3.0%

7.0%

7.0%

5.0%

5.0%

Bachelor’s Degrees
Masters/Ed Specialist
Degrees

25.0%

25.0%

25.0%

15.0%

15.0%

15.0%

15.0%

15.0%

Doctoral / Law Degrees

7.5%

7.5%

10.0%

10.0%

Research / Grant Funding

12.5%

12.5%

12.5%

15.0%

Student Transfers

5.0%

5.0%

5.0%

5.0%

Degrees per 100 FTE

10.0%

10.0%

7.5%

10.0%

Six-Year Graduation Rate

10.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%
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Comparing CCTA with the Best Practices


Keep the number of performance indicators low (<20)

The formula designed by the committee meets this practice. There are only ten
performance indicators by which universities are scored.



“Performance indicators should not be developed in a top-down
manner”
There needs to be buy-in by the state and faculty. Both should be
involved in creating the formula

The entire formula was developed with every key stakeholder. Chief academic
officers, institutional CFO’s, faculty, as well as the Secretary of State and State
Treasurer all helped create this formula. No one body or area of influence had
complete control over the formulation of the funding formula. With involvement
of every relevant party, “buy-in” was achieved. Everyone had a hand in creating a
policy they hoped and believed would work.


Institutions are different, indicators must be able to reflect this without
negatively impacting schools

By allowing each school to assign weights based on their primary mission, the
formula is able to adapt to these changes as necessary. By scaling the numbers
prior to weighing them, each institution is assessed equally, while their scoring
is individualized.


There need to be financial incentives for institutions
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Frankly, if the entirety of an institutions budget is not enough financial incentive
from those in-charge of institutional direction, there are much larger problems
at that institution than the amount of funding they will receive.


Policy-makers often more easily absorb quantitative measures than
qualitative measures.

Every indicator of the formula is quantifiable. This may ignore some of the more
qualitative and individually impactful aspects of an institution of higher learning,
such as the spark a student receives that tells them they have chosen the right
major; however, individually qualitative moments and interactions are
frustratingly difficult to measure. The formula opts to forego those qualitative
measures entirely, which makes the data more digestible for policy-makers.


Performance results should be easy to understand, and communicated
in a timely manner (Layzell, 1998)

The formula developed is incredibly simple. Every measure is quantitative, and
they each undergo three basic arithmetic functions: division, multiplication, and
addition. Each function occurs once, and the calculations can be done by hand.
Further, the calculations for each institution are published on the Tennessee
Higher Education Commission’s website soon after they are calculated. Any and
every one with a basic understanding of arithmetic can access and understand
this performance-based funding formula within weeks of the time that the
institutions do themselves (Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2011).
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The Impact of CCTA in Tennessee
At this point in time (Spring 2014), the funding formula from CCTA has
only been in complete operation for one year. There was a 3-year phase in
period in order to allow universities to adjust to the new funding metrics. This
does not mean that some impacts cannot already be seen throughout the state.
According to Governor Haslam, CCTA has “indeed changed the way we do
business.” Institutions have been looking now, more than ever, how they are
allocating funds. Institutions are spending more resources to directly interact
with students and ensure that they are registered for the right classes/major for
their career goals, and on their way to graduation (Haslam, 2012). It is far too
early to see the major impacts of this legislation, but it is worth noting that
universities are responding. A topic for future research is certainly what each
institution is doing individually to maximize their individual weight within the
formula. What practices yield the best results for which indicator? Do
demographics play a larger role than any individual program put forth by an
institution? These are the types of questions that need to be asked further down
the line now that there are reliable data and a time benchmarks with which to
measure the impact of a myriad of approaches to student retention and success.
Conclusion
Tennessee is a unique state. It rests in two different time zones, has three
distinct geographical regions that divide it into thirds, gave women the franchise,
and 20 years later helped develop the atomic bomb. All of these historical
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moments help make Tennessee unique, but its impact on higher education
should not be ignored. In the 1970s, its Higher Education Commission took it
upon themselves to assess institutions based on outcomes. Over thirty years,
with clear and deliberate action, Tennessee has maintained some of the most
stable higher education funding and institutional improvement by using
performance-based funding as an incentive. What began as 2% additional
allocation to an institutions budget, grew to 5.75% of an institutions actual
budget, and now encompasses the entirety of an institutions budget,
performance-based funding metrics began in Tennessee, matured in Tennessee,
and took bold steps in Tennessee.
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